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STANDING AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY:
HURDLES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
LITIGANTS
In order for a private individual to invoke the judicial power
to determine the validity of government action, he must show that
he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining a direct
harm as a result of that action. This harm is often referred to as
an "injury in fact" as opposed to a more abstract "injury" which
might be suffered by the public generally. It is insufficient for a
person to claim that he has suffered in a manner common to all
members of the public.' If a person seeks to restrain public officers
from acting in excess of their statutory authority, he must demon-
strate to the court an injury or threat to a particular legal right of
his own, as distinguished from the public interest in the adminis-
tration of the law.2 If the required allegations are not made, federal
courts (and most state courts) will find that the person has no stand-
ing-no right to litigate the issues-and refuse to hear the case
on its merits.
Standing is a nebulous concept which defies simple explanation.
It has been defined as the "[d]octrine that in [an] action in [a]
federal constitutional court by [a] citizen against a goverment of-
ficer, complaining of alleged unlawful conduct there is no justiciable
controversy unless [that] citizen shows that such conduct invades or
will invade a private substantive legally protected interest of plain-
tiff citizen."' This "definition," taken from a 1943 circuit court
opinion,' provides only a skeletal explanation of what standing is
and little insight into how the standing concept is used by federal
courts as a device for rejecting cases.
The requirement of standing sometimes operates as a self-
imposed federal court rule of judicial restraint to avoid deciding
"unimportant" issues,5 while at other times it has been improperly
used to enforce the constitutional requirement that the federaljudiciary limit its decisions to "cases and controversies." 6 In truth,
the rule of standing which denies a plaintiff the right to vindicate
constitutional rights of others who have suffered a general "injury"
1 Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1938).
2 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
3 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968) at 1577.
4 Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 1943).
5 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953), reh. den. 346 U.S. 841 (1953).
6 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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is merely a rule of practice of the federal courts. Many years ago,
the U.S. Supreme Court declared:
The requirement of standing is often used to describe the constitu-
tional limitation on the jurisdiction of this Court to "cases and con-
troversies." Apart from the judicial requirement, this court has
developed a complementary rule of self-restraint for its own gov-
ernance (not often clearly distinguished from the constitutional limita-
tion) which ordinarily precludes a person from challenging [the
propriety of government action] by invoking the rights of others. The
common thread underlying both requirements is that a person cannot
challenge [government action] unless he shows that he himself is in-
jured by its operation.7
In a later decision, the Court emphasized that requirements of stand-
ing were "not principles ordained by the Constitution, but rather
rules of practice" from which exceptions would always be proper
"where there are weighty countervailing policies. ' 8 Unfortunately,
it is not always easy to distinguish between a court's use of standing
as a constitutional concept as opposed to a rule of practice and, as
the U.S. Supreme Court recently declared, "generalizations about
standing to sue are largly useless as such."'
STANDING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: AN OVERVIEW
Historically, taxpayers have not had standing to challenge al-
legedly unconstitutional federal expenditures. In Frothingham v.
Mellon' ° the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that taxpayer interest in
federal expenditures is too remote, indeterminate, and minute, and
that any injury suffered by one person is shared with taxpayers in
general. Thus, an individual taxpayer had suffered no direct injury
in fact, but merely a general "injury" and had no standing to sue.
In this instance, standing was denied as a matter of self-imposed
judicial restraint.
Forty-five years later the Court distinguished Frothingham and
ruled in Flast v. Cohen" that a taxpayer may challenge a govern-
ment expenditure if he alleges it is part of a federal spending pro-
gram which exceeds specific constitutional limitations. Referring to
the constitutional limitations on federal court judisdiction, the Flast
decision held that "the question of standing is related only to whe-
ther the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an
7 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), reh. den. 346 U.S. 841 (1953).
8 U.S. v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960).
9 Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 
U.S. 150, 151
(1970).
10 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
11 392 U.S. 83, 104 (1968).
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adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable ofjudicial resolution."'1 2 Although the issue litigated was quite spe-
cialized, the Flast decision has contributed greatly to a liberalization
of the law of standing as it affects all litigants.
In 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court again considered the problem
of standing when it decided Jenkins v. McKeithen13 and noted thatthe concept of standing "is surrounded with the same complexities
and vagaries that inhere in [the concept of] justiciability" in gen-
eral. 4 The Court reiterated the basic, indispensible requirement for
standing, laid down in Baker v. Carr,'" that the party seeking relief
must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presenta-
tion of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumina-
tion of difficult constitutional questions."' 6 In Jenkins, the Court
went on to say that "[i] n this sense, the concept of standing focuses
on the party seeking relief, rather than on the precise nature of the
relief sought."' 7 In other words, in determining the matter of stand-ing a court must focus on who may assert certain contentions rather
than on what the contentions are.
More recently, in 1970, the U.S. Supreme Court again facedthe problem of standing in two cases decided the same day, Asso-
ciation of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, andBarlow v. Collins,'9 and promulgated a new two-step test for stand-ing: 1. Does the plaintiff allege "that the challenged action has
caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise"?2" 2. If suchinjury is alleged, does "the interest sought to be protected by the
complainant [lie] arguably within the zone of interests to be pro-
tected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question" ?21
The "zone of interest" requirement of this latest standing "test"is clearly out of step with earlier decisions of the Court and at odds
with the entire concept of standing. The fact that a litigant allegesinjury in fact under a federal statute due to actions of a government
12 Id. at 101.
13 395 U.S. 411 (1969). The opinion was shared by only three justices; two con-
curred in the result and three dissented.
14 Id. at 423.
15 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
16 Id. at 204.
17 395 U.S. at 423.
18 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
19 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
20 Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
152 (1970).
21 Id. at 153.
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agency or official is sufficient to satisfy the traditional standing test.
A "zone of interest" requirement for standing which goes beyond
this operates as a new rule of self-imposed judicial restraint rather
than as an obligation of the "cases and controversies" constitutional
limitation. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice White, argued vigor-
ously against the "zone of interest" step
22 because in applying such
a test a court must scrutinize relevant statutory materials "not to
determine standing but to determine an aspect of reviewability, that
is, whether Congress meant to deny or to allow judicial review of the
agency action at the instance of the plaintiff.1
23 Since this well-
reasoned dissent has not yet been followed by the Court, the "zone
of interest" test remains part of the law of standing today.
As administrative law expert Professor Kenneth Culp Davis
noted several years ago:
A plaintiff who seeks to challenge governmental action has standing if
a legal right of the plaintiff is at stake. When a legal right of the plain-
tiff is not at stake, a plaintiff sometimes has standing and sometimes
lacks standing. Circular reasoning is very common, for one of the
questions asked in order to determine whether a plaintiff has standing
is whether a plaintiff has a legal right, but the question whether a
plaintiff has a legal right is the final conclusion, for if the plaintiff
has standing his interest is a legally-protected interest, and that is
what is meant by a legal right.
24
It is no wonder that the concept of standing is regarded as one
of the most amorphous concepts in the field of law. U.S. Supreme
Court decisions which seem to promulgate new rules and guidelines
are of more practical use in clarifying earlier decisions than in pro-
viding substantive rules to be followed by prospective litigants. The
Court itself refers to the standing concept as a "complicated spe-
cialty of federal jurisdiction. 25
Fortunately, most state courts treat standing in a less complex
manner. Professor Davis claims that this distinction occurs because
federal courts have evolved a law of standing too complicated for
them to apply consistently, while state courts usually have perceived
the merits of the simple proposition that those adversely affected in
fact should be allowed to challenge that action which has injured
them.
26
22 Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167 et seq. (1970). [This dissent covers both
the Data Processing and Barlow cases.] See L. Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARv. L. Rxv.
633 (1971), for Prof. Jaffe's comments on these two most recent cases.
23 Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 169 (1970).
24 3 K. DAvis, ADmmisTRAvE LAw TREATiSE 217 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
3 K. DAvis]; see generally 3 K. DAvis § 22; L. JArE , JUDICIL CONTROL OF AD-
m IlSTATmVE AcTION 459-545 (1965).
25 U.S. ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
26 3 K. DAvis, 291-92 nn.2 & 3.
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The opinion written by Judge Tamm in Scanwell Laboratories,Inc. v. Shaffer27 provides a fine review of the problem of standing
wherein the court concludes that when Congress lays down guidelines
to be used in carrying out its mandate in some specific area, a pro-
cedure should exist whereby those injured by arbitrary and capri-
cious action of some government agency or official in ignoring thoseguidelines may "vindicate their very real interests, while at the same
time furthering the public interest. '2 Anyone who must face the
standing barrier would agree that such a procedure should exist,but, too often, standing has been denied litigants because federal
courts have found no such procedure.
STANDING FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGANT
It is easy to see that an environmental litigant, injured by somegovernmental agency decision, who files a class action in federal
court2 9 could easily find himself in the unfortunate position of Mrs.Frothingham if the U.S. Supreme Court had not chosen to expand
and liberalize the law of standing in recent years. Even now, a chal-lenged agency or official will undoubtedly raise the standing issue
along with the traditional claim of sovereign immunity.
Though the environmental litigant must be cognizant of theproblems which standing may present, the U.S. Supreme Court mayhave provided guidance through dictum when it declared, regarding
the question whether the interest alleged by a litigant is arguably
within a federal statute's zone of interests:
That interest, at times, may reflect "aesthetic, conservational, and
recreational" as well as economic values. [Citations omitted.] . . . We
mention these non-economic values to emphasize that standing may stemfrom them as well as from . . . economic injury .... 0
The Court further stated that "[w]here statutes are concerned, the
trend is toward enlargement of the class of people who may protest
27 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
28 Id. at 864.
29 Under liberalized Rule 23 of the Code of Federal Civil Procedure, care mustbe exercised in asserting that you are a member of the class you allegedly represent.See Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoerner-Waldorf, Civ. No. 1694 (W.D. Mont.,dismissed Aug. 27, 1970), 1 E.R.C. 1640:
Because the court has found a basis of standing to bring a non-class repre-
sentation action on behalf of a public interest the court is not required tofind a class action is maintainable. The requirement that a party be a memberof the class it allegedly represents may not be set aside. [Emphasis added.] IE.R.C. at 1641.[Note: B.N.A.'s Environment Reporter: Decisions are cited as E.R.C.]ao Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154
(1970).
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administrative action."81 The question remains, who comprises these
classes of people who may protest?
The greatest conservation or environmental victory of the
1960's occurred in the case of Scenic Hudson Preservation Confer-
ence v. FPC.82 This case, decided long before several recent U.S.
Supreme Court decisions which have liberalized the law of standing,
held that the Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference (an unin-
corporated association consisting of a number of non-profit con-
servationist organizations) and several towns each had standing to
challenge a decision of the Federal Power Commission which would
have allowed construction of a major hydroelectric project on the
west side of the Hudson River at Storm King Mountain in New
York. If allowed to proceed, this project would have destroyed the
unique aesthetic beauty and historical significance of an area widely
regarded as "one of the finest pieces of river scenery in the world.""
3
In granting standing, the court decided that to insure adequate pro-
tection of the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and
recreational aspects of power development by the Commission,
"those who by their activities and conduct have exhibited a special
interest in such areas, must be held to be included in the class of
'aggrieved' parties"8 4 as provided in the Federal Power Act. The
court's ruling required the Federal Power Commission to consider
viable alternatives, the impairment of scenic and recreational values,
effects on wildlife, and the like before granting a license under the
Federal Power Act.
While the principle of Scenic Hudson seems quite clear, subse-
quent cases seem to have been decided on a case by case basis, each
one requiring analysis of its relevant facts. This is a result of the
difficulty involved in establishing any clear guidelines in this per-
plexing area of standing for environmental litigants as well as the
reluctance of other jurisdictions to follow the lead of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit. One should note that several
cases decided before Data Processing and Barlow speak of a liti-
gant's "interest" in the environmental issue in question as providing
a basis for standing once an injury in fact (an injury affecting an
individual or group) is alleged. Such a personal interest in the in-
tegrity of the human environment should not be confused with the
current "zone of interest" of a relevant statute provision of the
current test for standing.
31 Id. at 154.
32 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), 1 E.R.C. 1084; cert. denied 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
33 354 F.2d at 612.
34 Id. at 616. The court was referring to § 313(b) of the Federal Power Act, 16
U.S.C.A. § 8251(b) (1960).
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Following the Scenic Hudson precedent, Road Review League,
Town of Bedford v. Boyd 5 granted standing to a town, a civic as-
sociation of residents of the town, two wildlife sanctuaries whoseproperty would be taken for the road, and a non-profit organization
primarily concerned with community problems involving the location
of roads."6 Although the plaintiffs were not formal parties to any of
the administrative proceedings, the court concluded that the terms
of the Administrative Procedure Act" as it related to sections of
the Federal Highway Act3 8 were "sufficient under the principle ofScenic Hudson to manifest a congressional intent that towns, local
civic groups and conservation groups are to be considered 'aggrieved'
by agency action which has allegedly disregarded their interests."39
More recently, in West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Is-land Creek Coal Co.,41 the court granted standing to a conservation
group because it was "a party who has demonstrated a continuing
conservation aesthetic interest in the welfare of the Otter CreekBasin."'" In this case, the plaintiff alleged that the government
agency failed to consider aesthetic and conservational purposes setforth in the several congressional acts applicable to the defendant's
application for a permit to prospect for coal on federal lands.
In another New York case, decided before Data Processing andBarlow, the court inadvertently applied a "zone of interest" test in
a positive rather than negative manner. The Citizens Committee for
the Hudson River Valley (an unincorporated association of citizens
residing near a proposed expressway), the Sierra Club (a non-profit
national conservationist organization), and the Village of Tarrytown
brought action against the U.S. Secretary of Transportation and
others to enjoin construction of an expressway in Citizens Commit-
tee v. Volpe42 and were adjudged to have the requisite standing to
maintain the litigation. The court ruled that when statutes involved
in a controversy are themselves concerned with the protection of
natural, historic, and scenic resources (the statute's "zone of inter-
est"), then a "congressional intent exists to give standing to groupsinterested in these factors and who allege that these factors are not
being properly considered by the agency."4
35 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
36 Id. at 652.
37 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-706 (1967).
38 23 U.S.C.A. §§ 101(b), 109(a), 134 (1966).
89 270 F. Supp. at 661. See also 3 K. DAVIS § 22.05 at 225.
40 Civ. No. 70-82E (N.D. W. Va. June 15, 1970), aff'd, 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir.1971).
41 Civ. No. 70-82E (N.D. W. Va. June 15, 1970). Transcript of Opinion of
Judge Maxwell at 96.
42 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), 1 E.R.C. 1096; aff'd 425 F.2d 97 (2d
Cir. 1970), 1 E.R.C. 1237.
43 302 F. Supp. at 1092 (emphasis added).
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In affirming this district court opinion, the circuit court held
that the plaintiffs had evidenced the seriousness of their concern with
local natural resources by the fact that they organized for the pur-
pose of cogently expressing that concern, that the intensity of their
concern was apparent from the great expense and effort they under-
took to protect the public interest they believed threatened by the
official action of state and federal governments, and that they
"proved the genuineness of their concern by demonstrating that they
[were] 'willing to shoulder the burdensome and costly process of
intervention' in an administrative proceeding."44 In effect the court
ruled that the concern evidenced by the plaintiffs in the local en-
vironment was so great that an injury to that environment would
cause injury in fact to the Citizens Committee and the others.
In a Colorado district court action, Crowther v. Seaborg,45 a
broad grant of standing was made to persons who either owned
property in the vicinity of a proposed nuclear detonation site (one
"resident" lived over thirty miles from the proposed site) or were
merely occasional users of the area. Standing was also granted to
a non-profit public benefit organization, dedicated to the preserva-
tion of open space in Colorado, to challenge the right of the Atomic
Energy Commission to authorize use of the area in question for
nuclear testing. Although the petitioners relied upon no specific
federal statutes in support of their claims, the court ruled that it
need cite no authority in support of the proposition that the law
protects interests of persons in their health and safety and that the
logical connection between plaintiffs' "status" as property owners
and occasional residents in the area of the proposed site and the
"threat" to their health and safety provided a sufficient basis for
an actual controversy.
46
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has held, in En-
vironmental Defense Fund v. Hardin,47 that the consumers' inter-
est in environmental protection may properly be represented by a
membership association with an organizational interest in the pro-
blem. In this instance, five conservation groups which engaged in
activities relating to environmental protection (the Environmental
44 425 F.2d at 103.
45 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1969), 1 E.R.C. 1199; aff'd 415 F.2d 737 (10th
Cir. 1969).
46 312 F. Supp. at 1215.
47 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428
(1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); National Students Ass'n v.
Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1120-21 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ; United Federation of Postal Clerks,
AFL-CIO v. Watson, 409 F.2d 462, 469-71 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S.
902 (1969); Citizens Committee v. Simonson, 403 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied 394 U.S. 975 (1969); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, Civ.
Ac. No. 2655-69 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 1971), 1 E.L.R. 20079. [Note: Environmental Law
Institute's Environmental Law Reporter is cited as E.L.R.].
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Defense Fund, National Audubon Society, Sierra Club, West Michi-
gan Environmental Action Council, and the Izaak Walton League of
America, intervenor) challenged the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture's certification of a pesticide, DDT, and requested that its use
be suspended.
Other environmental litigants have passed the test of standing
in a host of cases throughout the United States, though no common
legal principle or theory of statutory construction exists in all of
them.4" Because of these favorable decisions, it should be well estab-
lished that the law of standing for environmental litigants is at least
as broad as has been expressed in the preceeding cases. Furthermore,
a demonstrated interest in environmental protection and preserva-
tion on the part of individuals or organizations should constitute a
sufficient personal stake in the outcome of a case for them to suffer
"injury in fact" and have standing as "private attorney generals"
to challenge activities they feel are detrimental both to their interests
and the interests of the general public. If this analysis were so, stand-
ing would be readily available for the environmental litigant seeking
to challenge governmental action and the problem of standing
would have been overcome. Though various environmental organiza-
tions have been granted standing and many cases are presently
pending which involve environmental issues,4 the standing barrier
remains.
48 Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
154 (1970). Accord Environmental Defense Fund v. U.S. Department of HEW, 428F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093(D.C. Cir. 1970); Citizens Committee v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970) ; Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). See also Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Crowther v. Seaborg,
415 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1969); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency,
395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968); Nashville 1-40 Steering Committee v. Ellington, 387
F.2d 179, 180-81 (6th Cir. 1967); Delaware v. Pennsylvania New York Cent. Transp.
Co., 323 F. Supp. 487 (D. Del. 1971), 1 E.L.R. 20105; Parker v. U.S., 307 F. Supp.
685 (D. Colo. 1969); Shannon v. U.S. Department of HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 821-28(E.D. Penn. 1968); Road Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp.
650, 660-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
49 For other cases granting standing to environmentalists, see Pennsylvania En-
vironmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Penn. 1970), 1 E.R.C. 1271;
Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair, 313 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1970), 1 E.R.C. 1401.
Other cases pending in federal courts where standing is a major issue include:
Alpine Lakes Protection Society v. Hardin, Civ. No. 8885 (W.D. Wash. filed April
14, 1970) [several environmental groups, including the Sierra Club, seek to void a
contract granted by defendants for construction of a heavy duty mining access trail in
the Snoqualmie National Forest]; Association of Northwest Steelheaders v. Corps ofEng'rs, Civ. No. 3362 (E.D. Wash. filed March 11, 1970) [eight sportsmen and some
conservation groups seek a permanent injunction restraining defendants from building
two dams on the Snake River]; Stewart v. Resor, Civ. No. 70-551 (E.D. Penn. filed
Feb. 24, 1970) [groups and individuals, including the Sierra Club, seek a permanent
injunction to restrain defendants from interfering with Tinicum Marshes and Wildlife
Preserve during construction of Interstate Highway 95]; Ottinger v. Penn. Central,
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REGRESSION IN THE NINTH CIRcUIT
Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard
Sierra Club v. Hickel (now Sierra Club v. Morton)50 and decided
that the Sierra Club had no right to be in court in regard to matters
concerning the Sierra-Nevada Mountains. This decision has placed
the Ninth Circuit squarely in conflict with decisions in several other
circuits and has created a confusion which, hopefully, will be re-
solved when the U.S. Supreme Court hears the case during the 1971
Fall Term."' Presently, however, the Sierra Club, which was granted
standing nationally to challenge the use of DDT12 and was granted
standing in Colorado to protect a forest 3 and in New York to pre-
serve a scenic-historical area,' 4 has no right to be in court in the very
area where the club was founded and wherein it carries on its prin-
cipal activities. Further irony is provided by the fact that the Sierra
Club, with the advice of its founder John Muir, actually established
some of the present boundary lines of the Sequioa National Park,
a portion of which is involved in the Sierra Club v. Morton contro-
versy. Of course, there are other cases on record in which standing
has been denied to environmental litigants,55 and it seems reasonable
68 Civ. 2838, 68 Civ. 4353 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 8, 1969) [action by N.Y. State Con-
gressman, sportsman's group, and others to restrain Penn. Central from causing or
permitting pollution of the Hudson River by effluents discharged from defendant's
rail yards at Harmon, N.Y.-action stayed pending outcome of Penn. Central bank-
ruptcy hearings].
50 Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970) [Judge Hamley concurring
on the merits, but dissenting on the decision Sierra Club lacked standing], cert. granted
401 U.S. 907 (1970) sub nom. Sierra Club v. Morton.
51 In "distinguishing" many of the earlier decisions which granted standing to
environmental litigants, the Ninth Circuit noted that in every case the environmental-
ists, who asserted no economic injury, were joined with others who did claim eco-
nomic loss. Because the Sierra Club asserted no economic injury in the Hickel case
and did not join with litigants who claimed some economic loss, the court ruled the
Club had no standing. This twisted bit of judicial "reasoning" fails to take into con-
sideration the basic fact of pleading which requires each potential litigant to meet the
standing barrier individually. A mere aggregation of plaintiffs does not provide them
all with sufficient injury to meet a standing test. A local resident or local property
owner (which the Ninth Circuit claimed the Sierra Club should have joined with in
the suit) would not have standing unless injury were shown. In each environmental
case which the Ninth Circuit "distinguished," standing was granted to the environ-
mental plaintiffs after a careful judicial analysis of their claims. Standing was granted
the environmentalists because of the claims they asserted, not merely because other
parties to the action claimed economic loss. If any environmental plaintiff did not have
standing, he should have been severed from the case, yet this did not happen.
For further critical analysis of the Ninth Circuit's decision on standing in the
Hickel case, see 6 GONZAGA L. REv. 328 (1971).
52 Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970), 1
E.R.C. 1347.
53 Parker v. U.S., 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970), 1 E.R.C. 1163.
54 Citizens Committee v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
55 For example Magnaghi v. Volpe, Civ. No. 70-128 (S.D. Fla. dismissed April
30, 1970) [denying standing to an adjacent property owner representing a class who
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to assume that there have been numerous cases dismissed on the
standing issue at the pleading stage.
In their brief as amicii curiae before the U.S. Supreme Court
in support of the Sierra Club's petition for certiorari in the Hickel
case, the Wilderness Society, Izaak Walton League, and Friends of
the Earth point out some of the grave problems which might occur
if environmentalists lack standing. Because environmental cases
often raise issues which either do not involve or only indirectly in-
volve direct users of a particular area, the protection of wilderness
areas, the survival of rare and endangered species, and the preserva-
tion of wildlife refuges, the integrity of natural rivers and the natural
or scenic aspect of landscape all present standing problems to pro-
spective litigants. In situations involving environmental abuses,
persons and groups whose purpose is protection and preservation of
the environment are the only ones who suffer the "injury in fact"
sufficient to undertake litigation.
Those who bring the suits may incidentally be users in that they or
their members have walked, watched and beheld the subject of the
litigation. However, such use is often incidental to the larger purpose
to protect the integrity of the environment. And if the only persons
with standing are users no one will have standing where there is no
present use (such as a suit to preserve the wilderness) or no use is
possible (such as a suit to prevent the chemical poisoning of eagles). 56
Furthermore, "users" themselves may be unwilling to sue if they
are more concerned with possible economic benefits from a pro-
posed action than they are with the resulting environmental loss.
Perhaps local and national conservation organizations are the only
parties who will "represent the national, as opposed to local, in-
terest by opposing development." 57
EFFECT OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Administrative Procedure Act
The whole area of standing was greatly aided by passage of
the Administrative Procedure Act"8 [hereinafter referred to as
APA]. As a result of the APA, "[a] person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,
is entitled to judicial review thereof."5 9 Before reaching the merits
sought a permanent injunction prohibiting operation of a jet training airport near
Everglades National Park].
50 Sierra Club v. Morton, cert. granted 401 U.S. 907 (1970), amicii curiae brief
at 6.
57 Id.
58 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551-706 (1967) [Particularly pertinent are §§ 701-706].
59 5 U.S.C.A. § 702 (1967).
[Vol. 12
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in Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer,6" the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia conducted an exhaustive re-
view of the APA's legislative history. The court then held that
when a person makes a prima facie showing alleging arbitrary and
capricious abuses of discretion on the part of an agency or official,
that person has standing to sue under section 702 of the APA.6
Although section 702 refers to parties "aggrieved" rather than
"aggrieved in fact" (analogous to the "injured in fact" test set
forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Data Processing and Barlow
cases),6 the legislative history of the APA supports the contention
that the words "in fact" were implied, since language to that effect
appears in the reports of both the Senate and House Committees.
The Senate Report states that "[t]his subsection [§ 702] confers
a right of review upon any person adversely affected in fact by
agency action or aggrieved within the meaning of any statute. 63
Though this exact language did not appear in the statute as finally
enacted, the U.S. Attorney General stated that the language of the
Senate Document was reflective of existing law.6
Lending further support to the contention that the APA should
be liberally interpreted in favor of those who propose to litigate
under its terms is the statement of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Barlow v. Collins65 that it is "only upon a showing of 'clear and
convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent that the courts
should restrict access to judicial review." It seems clearly the
intent of Congress that the APA apply to all situations where a
person aggrieved in fact seeks judicial review regardless of a lack
of legal right or specific statutory language granting judicial review.
Section 701 of the APA67 lists those actions which are not
reviewable and includes situations where "statutes preclude judicial
review" as well as those where "agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law."168 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
60 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
61 Id. at 869.
62 Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
63 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 212, 276 (1946) (emphasis added).
64 Id. at 310.
65 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
66 Id. at 167. Stated previously and elaborated upon in Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967), which supports the contention that the APA's
"generous review provisions" must be given a "hospitable interpretation." See also
Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-380 (1962).
67 5 U.S.C.A. § 701 (1967).
68 5 U.S.C.A. § 701(a) (1967).
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Sixth Circuit addressed itself to the question of agency discretion
in Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. U.S.,69 and ruled:
A court may not review a decision committed to the discretion of an
agency pursuant to a permissive type statute, but may do so where
the decision was made pursuant to a mandatory type statute even
though the latter decision involves some degree of discretion.7 0
Many of the congressional acts which environmentalists call
upon in support of their claims of improper agency action contain
a list of mandatory factors to be considered by the agency prior
to its action.71 Since these factors are sometimes ignored, the chal-
lenged agency may become subject to judicial review. In reference
to this point, the court in Citizens Committee v. Volpe held:
The rule, therefore, is that if the statutes involved in the controversy
are concerned with the protection of natural, historic and scenic re-
sources, then a congressional intent exists to give standing to groups
interested in these factors and who allege that these factors are not
being properly considered by the agency.72
The circuit court, in affirming, elaborated upon rights of environ-
mental litigants to invoke review provisions of the APA, holding
that there can no longer be any question that Congress intended
the APA to guarantee comprehensive review of a "broad spectrum
of administrative actions," which include those made reviewable
by specific statutes as well as those actions for which no review is
available under any other statute.78
Indeed, many other courts have found environmental litigants
to be "aggrieved" persons under the terms of the APA,74 but the
69 395 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1968).
70 Id. at 358.
71 The following is a partial list of congressional acts relied upon by environ-
mentalists in support of claims that they have been "aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute:" 16 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1960) [National Park Service
conservation requirement]; 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 528-529 (Supp. 1971) [Multiple Use-Sus-
tained Yield Act]; 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 580(m) & (n) (Supp. 1971) [conservation guide-
lines for Corps of Eng'rs in reservoir development]; 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 661, 662(a),
668(a) & (b) (1960) [Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act]; 16 U.S.C.A. § 695(k)
(Supp. 1971) [regarding migratory waterfowl]; 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 701 et seq. (1960)
[Migratory Bird Act]; 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 757(a)-(f) (Supp. 1971) [Anadromous Fish
Conservation Act]; 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 760(a)-(g) (1960) [for migratory game fish
protection]; 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 803(a) et seq. (1960) [Federal Power Act]; 16 U.S.C.A.§§ 1131 et seq. (Supp. 1971) [Wilderness Act]; 16 U.S.C.A. § 1271 (Supp. 1971)
[Wild and Scenic Rivers Act]; 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-406(k) (1970) [Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899]; 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4347 (Supp. 1971) [National Environmental Policy
Act]; 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1651(b)(2), 1653(f) (Supp. 1971) [Department of Transporta-
tion Act].
72 302 F. Supp. at 1092 (emphasis added).
73 425 F.2d at 102. Referring to Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 140 (1967). See also S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945) ; H.R. REP.
No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946).
74 Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., Civ. No. 70-82E (N.D.
COMMENTS
Ninth Circuit held that the Sierra Club was not sufficiently "ag-
grieved" or "adversely affected" to qualify as a litigant under the
APA's generous provisions. 75 The court ruled that "[t]he right
to sue does not inure to one who does not possess it, simply be-
cause there is no one else willing to assert it."
76
Fortunately for those groups or individuals who seek preserva-
tion and restoration of environmental quality, the Ninth Circuit
represents a minority view. However, it is a view that will con-
tinue to inhibit protection of the environment within the Ninth
Circuit's jurisdiction which includes almost eighty percent of all
federally-owned land in the United States .77 Hopefully, as Profes-
sor Davis urges, the U.S. Supreme Court will make a full-scale
inquiry into the legislative history of the APA's provisions on stand-
ing when it decides the Sierra Club v. Morton case and will rule
that the APA applies to all situations where a party who is in fact
aggrieved seeks judicial review.78
National Environmental Policy Act
Section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of
196971 [hereinafter referred to as NEPA] requires federal agencies
to prepare an environmental impact statement for any "major" s0
agency actions significantly affecting environmental quality. There
is strong support for the proposition that this section acts as an
amendment to all existing federal legislation to the effect that all
"policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall
be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies
set forth in this Act.'
'18
W. Va. June 15, 1970) [opinion of the Court at 80, 89-98], aff'd 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir.
1971); Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238, 244 (M.D.
Penn. 1970). See also Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397
U.S. 150, 153 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1970) [general dis-
cussion of APA review provisions].
75 Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 32 (9th Cir. 1970).
76 Id.
77 PUBLIC LAND LAW REvIEw COs .SSION, ONE TIRD OF T=E NATION'S LAND:
A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS, Appendix F at 327 (1970). The total
amount of federally-owned land in states within the Ninth Circuit comprises 68.6696
of the total land area of those states. 78.46% of all federally-owned land in the United
States lies within the Ninth Circuit.
78 K. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 450, 462
(1970). For a very thorough discussion of the APA, see Comment, 41 U. COLO. L.
REv. 96 (1969). For comments regarding the difference of opinion regarding standing
between Professors Davis and Jaffe, see 6 GONZAGA L. REv. 328 (1971).
79 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4347 (Supp. 1971).
80 As one might imagine, there are considerable differences of opinion between
environmentalists and federal agencies as to what constitutes such a major action that
an impact statement must be prepared.
81 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (Supp. 1971). See also Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm.,
Inc. v. AEC, Nos. 24,839 & 24,871 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 1971).
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R. Frederic Fisher, a San Francisco attorney who specializes
in administrative and conservation law and is a director of the
Sierra Club Legal Committee, suggests that environmentalists should
present the following argument:
Any time a federal statute grants discretion to a federal agency,
either to license a private activity or to embark on a federal project or
as to how a federal project should be administered or run or go for-
ward, that discretion must be exercised consistently with NEPA policy
to the fullest extent possible. If NEPA does not require this conclusion,
what did Congress mean, then, when it said "to the fullest extent pos-
sible?"8 2
Using such a rationale, it should be possible to secure judicial review
of matters committed to agency discretion by law at least to the
extent that an agency decision has disregarded any NEPA require-
ments.
The theory that NEPA leads to substantive conclusions rather
than a mere requirement that federal agencies perform cursory
environmental studies is given additional support in provisions of
the Guidelines for Federal Agencies under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act88 (issued by the Council on EnvironmentalQuality, the "enforcement agency" created by NEPA). The guide-
lines require that agencies considering major actions which will
significantly affect the environment conduct environmental studies(pursuant to preparation of the NEPA-required impact statement)
in such a way as to insure "that adverse effects are avoided and
environmental quality is restored or enhanced, to the fullest extent
practicable."84 It is quite possible (since NEPA is presently being
strengthened through judicial interpretation) that courts will decide
this language imposes a requirement on agencies to necessarily fol-
low the conclusions reached by the studies NEPA forces them to
make which have the least adverse effect on the environment.
Significantly, sections 102A, C, and D of NEPA 5 have already
become the subjects of successful litigation against noncomplying
agencies,86 and NEPA provisions have been successfully pleaded
82 R. Frederic Fisher, Environmental Issues and Administrative Agencies Practice,
an address before the National Conference on Environmental Law, San Francisco,
California, Nov. 7, 1970. Mr. Fisher was quoting from section 102 of NEPA, 42U.S.C.A. § 4332 (Supp. 1971). See also S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14-19
(1969).
83 36 Fed. Reg. 1398 (Jan. 28, 1971).
84 36 Fed. Reg. 1398, § 2 at 1398 (Jan. 28, 1971). Further support for this conten-
tion is found in Senator Jackson's comments regarding NEPA at 115 CoNo. REC.
17,451 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1969).
85 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4332(A), (C) & (D) (Supp. 1971).
86 Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, Nos. 24,839 & 24,871
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before one court to provide review of an agency contract entered
into before the Act's passage.87 On the other hand, the court in
Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett88 concluded that
NEPA did not apply to a contract for a federally-funded project
signed prior to the passage of NEPA. Section 11 of the Guidelines89
and the intent of NEPA, however, support the conclusion that the
Act applies retroactively.
The environmental litigant has at his disposal, therefore, a
congressionally-inspired tool in the form of NEPA which will be-
come whatever the courts, agencies, and concerned environmen-
talists shape it into. The Act has exciting and far-reaching potential
for interpretation into an "environmental bill of rights."
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Most agency defendants in environmental lawsuits automati-
cally raise the defense that the action is an unconsented-to suit
against the sovereign, while challenging the court's jurisdiction
over other substantive matters at the same time. The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that an appropriate inquiry into the matter of
sovereign immunity does not involve questions of the substance
of the cause of action at all, since such an inquiry "confuses the
doctrine of sovereign immunity with the requirement that the
plaintiff state a cause of action."9 In determining the question of
sovereign immunity the court must ask only whether it is deprived
of personal jurisdiction over the defendants because of their rela-
tionship to the sovereign. The question of personal jurisdiction
must be considered thoroughly and carefully, for the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled long ago in U.S. v. Lee9 that immunity seems opposed
to all the principles upon which the rights of the citizen, when in
conflict with acts of the government, must be determined. The
Court reasoned that when such conflict occurs, the only legal pro-
tection a citizen has for his rights which have been invaded by
officers of the government, professing to act in its name, is the
review offered by judicial tribunals. The other alternative the citizen
has is resistance, which may amount to a crime.
92
(D.C. Cir. July 23, 1971); Wilderness Society v. Hickel, Civ. No. 928-70 (D.D.C.
April 23, 1970), 1 E.R.C. 1355.
87 Sierra Club v. Laird, Civ. No. 70-78 (D. Ariz. filed May 25, 1970), preliminary
inj. granted June 23, 1970.
88 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Penn. 1970), 1 E.R.C. 1271, 1279.
89 36 Fed. Reg. 1398, § 11 at 1400 (Jan. 28, 1971).
90 Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 692-93 (1949).
91 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
92 Id. at 218-19.
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Typically, an agency or official will file a motion to dismiss
upon the ground that the suit is in substance and effect one against
the United States, which has not consented to be sued or waived
its immunity from suit. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has
declared that there are two well-recognized exceptions to the doc-
trine that "the sovereign is immune.""
Those exceptions are (1) action by officers beyond their statutory
powers and (2) even though within the scope of their authority, the
powers themselves or the manner in which they are exercised are con-
stitutionally void. [Citation omitted.] In either of such cases, the
officer's action "can be made the basis of a suit for specific relief against
the officer as an individual . . . ." [Citation omitted.] 94
In following this reasoning, it seems evident that the allowable
scope of judicial inquiry into sovereign immunity is limited to
the allegations stated upon the face of the complaint itself and
that the inquiry must extend only into the jurisdictional basis for
the litigation, not into the merits of the cause of action as a whole.
In Carter v. Seamons,9" the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
declared that courts have adopted the procedure, for jurisdictional
purposes, of accepting at face value the averments of the complaint
unless they are so patently inconsequential or frivolous as to afford
no possible basis for jurisdiction, thus avoiding a decision on the
merits under the guise of resolving preliminary jurisdictional issues.
In the Carter case, the court found the claims to be affirmative and
explicit and not insubstantial or frivolous. Accepting the plaintiff's
contentions as true, merely for jurisdictional purposes, the court
ruled that the case, sub judice, was not against the United States,
but merely an action to compel a government agency official to per-
form a clear legal duty. Thus, the defense of sovereign immunity
was not allowed. 6
Basically, court decisions have held that when an administrator
is accused of an abuse of discretion or of acting ultra vires, sover-
eign immunity cannot be raised successfully as a defense, for the
person is not acting in behalf of the sovereign, but merely as an
individual abusing the powers granted him by the sovereign. 7
9S Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1963). Accord Malone v. Bowdoin,
369 U.S. 643 (1962); Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949);
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 233 U.S. 605 (1912); U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882);
Carter v. Seamons, 411 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp.
1205 (D. Colo. 1970), 1 E.R.C. 1199.
04 Dugan v. Rank, 382 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1963).
95 411 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1969).
96 Id. at 770.
97 See also Parker v. U.S., 307 F. Supp. 684, 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970)[holding that an administrator is bound by his agency's own regulations]; Abbott
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Another basis for rejection of the defense of sovereign immunity
is provided for claims which are based upon jurisdiction under the
Administrative Procedure Act."' The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled in Estrada v. Ahrens9" that when Congress provided judicial
review in actions brought by "any person adversely affected or
aggrieved by any agency action," it expressly authorized suits which,
if ordinary tests were applied, would be barred as unconsented-to
suits against the government and that "[tlhe Act thereby makes
a clear waiver of sovereign immunity in all actions to which it
applies." 0 Congress' declaration that judicial review of agency
action is available to those aggrieved thereby leads to the inescapable
conclusion that there exists a congressional intent to waive the de-
fense of sovereign immunity. Any other interpretation of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act makes its review provisions chimerical. 10'
Although the defense of sovereign immunity appears in almost
all cases where environmentalists challenge agency action, most
courts realize the necessity of making agency decision-makers re-
sponsive to challenges by a concerned citizenry and reject agency
attempts to hide behind the sovereign's cloak. Hopefully, the
thoughts which Justice Douglas expressed in his dissent in Malone
v. Bowdoin'012 will attain universal acceptance in the U.S. courts:
"Sovereign immunity has become more and more out of date as
the powers of the Government and its vast bureaucracy have in-
creased."'0 As rejection of this defense becomes more widespread,
we may look for agency decisions which, because of the spectre
Laboratories v. Celebrezze, 228 F. Supp. 855 (D. Del. 1964), aff'd sub nom. Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
98 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-706 (1967).
99 296 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1961).
100 Id. at 698. See also Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29, 34-35 (9th Cir. 1958);
Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. U.S. Department of HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809,
834 (E.D. Penn. 1968); 3 K. DAvis 434-47 n.2; H. Hart and H. Wechsler, The New
Sovereign Immunity, 81 HARV. L. REV. 929 (1968).
101 For support for this contention, see Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer,
424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ; Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair, 313 F. Supp. 1312
(D. Minn. 1970); Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970); Parker
V. U.S., 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970); West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v.
Island Creek Coal Co., Civ. No. 70-82E (N.D. W. Va. June 15, 1970), aff'd 441 F.2d
232 (4th Cir. 1971).
But see Magnaghi v. Volpe, Civ. No. 70-128 (S.D. Fla. dismissed May 7, 1970)
[dismissed due to lack of standing as well as sovereign immunity]. Though many
courts have held that a waiver of sovereign immunity occurs when a state becomes
active in a field subject to federal regulations, see Pennsylvania Environmental Council,
Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Penn. 1970) [dismissing the complaint only
as to state secretary of highways, several contractors and other instrumentalities of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on sovereign immunity grounds].
102 369 U.S. 643 (1962).
103 Id. at 652. For a good discussion of Malone and other cases, see Izaak Walton
League v. St. Clair, 313 F. Supp. 1312, 1314-15 (D. Minn. 1970), 1 E.R.C. 1401.
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of judicial rebuff, are more responsive to the public good rather
than to the special interests of a select few. Presently, however,
sovereign immunity remains as another threshold barrier to judicial
review of agency action which environmentalists must overcome.
CONCLUSION
Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have brought litigants
a long way from a narrow standing test based primarily on a "legal
interest" concept. There is hope that future decisions of the Court
will accept the position of Justices Brennan and White that "injury
in fact" should be the sole test of a federal court litigant's stand-
ing.Y4 Until such a decision is made, however, we must stumble
through a morass of cases which, while they provide clues as to
how to present allegations in support of a right to standing, can-
not provide assurance that an environmental litigant will have
standing to adjudicate very real injuries to the interests of the group
he represents or the public in general. Imposition of the additional
"zone of interest" test causes needless confusion.
Professor Davis suggests an alteration of the "zone of interest"
test that would make it a useful tool rather than a burden. He
suggests that "[a] person whose legitimate interest is injured infact should have standing unless congressional intent is discernible
that the interests he asserts is not to be protected."' ° If the Davis
view were adopted, plaintiffs would not be required to plead that
they fall within a statute's purview, but the burden would be shifted
to the defendant to assert that the statute was not intended to pro-
vide review. A "test" thus phrased in positive terms would be well
suited to the legislative history of the Administrative Procedure
Act and would help to eliminate the type of "forum shopping" which
forces a litigant to challenge government agencies in the more favor-
able jurisdiction of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia rather than in federal courts within the domain
of more rigid or "hostile" circuits, such as the Ninth Circuit.
The object of the law is, or should be, to allow the airing of
grievances as it administers justice. Present complexities which
surround the amorphous concept of standing create artificial bar-
riers to justice which should be removed. Once a person or group
has alleged that his legitimate interest has been injured in fact
by improper action of an agency or official, he should be granted
104 Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 168 (1970).
105 K. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. RaV. 450, 472
(1970).
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standing to pursue a judicial determination of the merits of his
allegation in the federal courts.
One might ask what is a "legitimate interest" of an environ-
mental litigant or how such a person or group may be "injured
in fact" when no monetary loss is alleged. A businessman is "in-
jured in fact" when agency action causes him economic loss.
Similarly, a local resident or property owner may suffer economic
loss when adversely affected by agency decisions. The environmental
litigant suffers no such economic damage, yet as an individual or
representative of a group with an interest in the protection and
preservation of the human environment, he is "injured in fact"
when the integrity of our environment is degraded. In truth, the
entire nation is "injured" when environmental degradation occurs,
but a person or group with an avowed purpose or "interest" in
the protection of the environment for the enjoyment of present
and future generations suffers most acutely. Justice requires that
the environmental litigant be heard in our courts.
In the same interest of justice, the Administrative Procedure
Act and judicial decisions should resoundingly defeat the claim of
sovereign immunity whenever it is raised as a defense in litigation
which alleges illegal agency or official action.
As more and more of our lives and our environment are affected
by federal agency decisions, it becomes increasingly important that
individuals and groups have the right to appear in court to challenge
allegedly illegal agency actions which have caused them injury. The
ideal of a bureaucracy which is responsive to the public it serves de-
mands no less. It will not be sufficient in future years to try to
rectify today's mistakes; we must act today to assure that the
mistakes are not made. Judicial review of government action is
one sure method of preventing mistakes.
Peter Heiser, Jr.
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